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The Intuitive Recommencement of 
Metaphysics 
Bergson’s Kantianism 
Camille Riquier (translated by Erik Beranek) 
Catholic University of Paris 
In retaining the name of metaphysics, in reinstating its prerogatives, is 
Bergson a pre-critical philosopher, who has lost his way in our modernity? Is 
it not imprudent of him to stick his neck out—here, where the Kantian 
tribunal regularly lets fall the blade of its guillotine—when he declares 
possible what the Critique of Pure Reason asserted to be impossible? Or is he a 
resolutely modern philosopher, who takes care at each instance to remove the 
objections that Kant could have inflicted upon him, including even the 
illusions upon which his Critique rested? The question will have to be 
formulated differently if we are to shed light on the relationship that Bergson 
maintains with Kant, for the relationship is too complex for us to be able to 
resolve it with such a clean cut. If Bergson passed through his studies without 
encountering any German influence, if he even began to write heedless of the 
Kantian interdictions that weighed upon his project, the obstacle that Kant set 
down in his path had to capture his attention eventually, for he was reminded 
of it constantly. Even when already well upon his way, he was assured that 
he was really getting nowhere—such was the extent to which his ignorance 
of the critical turn must have served in place of a devastating objection to his 
metaphysics. The fact remains that the “break” with Kantianism, which he 
“only glimpsed”1 when writing Time and Free Will, was given greater and 
greater emphasis. Discreetly with Matter and Memory, then openly in his 
“Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson wanted to remove the obstacle, to 
confront it. Since that was the atmosphere of his time, that was also the 
language he had to borrow if he wanted to be understood: the “Introduction 
to Metaphysics” (1903), as Bergson recalls, “was written at a time when Kant’s 
criticism and his successors’ dogmatism were more or less generally accepted, 
if not as its conclusion, at least as the starting point of philosophical 
speculation.”2 And thus, since the end of metaphysics had been proclaimed 
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(“conclusion”), Bergson had to introduce us to metaphysics anew, after Kant 
had given its critique (“starting point”). 
We must, however, be clear. Was metaphysics only interrupted? Strictly 
speaking, it is or it is not, and the paradox would be that Bergson would have 
had to wait for his confrontation with Kant before he could begin doing 
metaphysics. He would have had to wait for Creative Evolution to clear up the 
illusions of nothingness and of disorder that encircle our intelligence and 
convince it that the real is distant or inaccessible. But in reality, these illusions 
are always already cleared up for an intelligence that intuition has long since 
“shaken from its [dogmatic] slumber,”3 as was the case for Bergson from the 
time of his first book; only later are they recognized for what they are. Kantian 
critique, which rests entirely upon them, can therefore be ignored for quite 
some time. For it neither hinders nor postpones the forward march of a 
thought that has already inhaled the air that bears the thing itself, as it is “in 
itself”—only a thought encumbered with ideas of its own making, which it 
carries along “as impedimenta”4 would be so impeded. That is why critical 
questions only bother the one who poses them (“what can I know?,” what 
must I do?,” what am I permitted to hope for?”). Human thought “can equally 
well ignore Kantian philosophy and the ‘theories of knowledge’ which derive 
from it,”5 and go straight to the essential questions that the Kantian 
moratorium had put to an end, making it such that they could no longer arise 
for anyone: “Whence are we? What are we? Whither tend we? These are the 
vital questions, which immediately present themselves when we give 
ourselves up to philosophical reflexion without regard to philosophical 
systems.”6 These are questions, Pascalian in their formulation, that Bergson 
was able to reinvest only after having saved them from the state of dialectical 
upheaval Kant had left them in—unanswered, if not abandoned to oblivion—
when he bound them to rational psychology.7 In other words, the only means 
Bergson found for responding to the question “what is man?” was to begin 
by posing it, naively, without passing, like Kant, through the preliminary 
study of the mechanism of our thought. “[T]he metaphysician does not thus 
sacrifice the use of the mind for the criticism of mind, the end for the means, 
the prey for the shadow,”8 and if Bergson did critique Kant at times, it was to 
the extent that the Critique prevented him or others from moving forward. 
Moreover, the critique he addressed to him might have fallen along with the 
obstacle had Bergson not proposed, more extensively, to critique the natural 
mechanism of our intelligence and its aforementioned illusions, which have 
in fact been present since Zeno, and which Kant simply has the merit of 
having systematized. Does nothingness precede being, and disorder, order? 
“The whole object of the Critique of Pure Reason,” Bergson writes, “is, in fact, 
to explain how a particular order is superadded to supposedly incoherent 
materials.”9 Kant condenses illusions that existed before him. In this sense, 
Bergson is neither post-Kantian nor pre-critical. Nor, for that matter, was he 
ever “Kant’s adversary.”10 
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Pre- or Post-  
(i) Was Bergson post-Kantian? If the Critique is the trial by fire to which 
Bergson agreed to submit his metaphysics, so that it might die there and be 
reborn like a phoenix, this risk does not suffice to make Bergson a post-
Kantian in the strict sense. Paraphrasing a passage from “Philosophical 
Intuition,” we might maintain that Bergson would have been the same 
without Kant, although he would “doubtless have written something other 
than what he wrote.”11 Kant is for him what, in his eyes, Descartes was for 
Spinoza, namely, the language that was spoken in his time and the doctrine 
one had to don in order to communicate therein. More than any other text, the 
“Introduction to Metaphysics” retains his trace. But the intuitive ground of 
the Bergsonian doctrine really goes back, beyond Kant, to Descartes himself: 
an active cogito, immersed in concrete duration. 
(ii) Was Bergson therefore pre-critical? To an even lesser extent is 
Bergson pre-critical, and though Cartesian, he took note of obstacles that 
could block his way, surmounted them as he met them, and wanted, in fact, 
to lift metaphysics up [relever] after Kant had felled it. And he could not 
remove those obstacles without attacking the illusions that were found 
clinging to their roots, on account of which Kant still shared more with the 
metaphysics of the ancients, against which he fought. 
We must take a step to the side, then, if we want to grasp the true 
relationship between Bergson and Kant, which is too subtle to be confined to 
the alternative with which we began—and which is sufficiently explicit and 
even surprising when one thinks of the declarations made in the final chapter 
of Creative Evolution, where, instead of confirming the clunky opposition one 
might have naively expected, Bergson declares himself to be Kantian. After 
Descartes, before Spencer, Kant is another “missing precursor of Bergson.”12 
In Bergson’s eyes, Kant, like Descartes, contains two possible paths for 
philosophy, which reflect the two fundamental tendencies that are mixed 
together in the élan vital and continued in humankind: intuition and 
intelligence. Thus, Bergson shifts the lines and breaks with Kant from the inside 
of his philosophy, which he divides into two Kantianisms: the one, which he 
rejects as ancient, and the other, which he appropriates. It is not, however, a 
question of drawing out a latent Bergsonism in Kant, as Alain Panero thought, 
but rather of restoring the Kantianism that is completed in Bergson—a 
Kantianism that embarked down a path that Kant himself, who held himself 
back from following it in order to dispense with all “intellectual” intuition, 
had only sketched. The “Introduction to Metaphysics,” then, is not written 
simply to settle the score with Kant, as if the latter represented a levee holding 
back “the surge of metaphysics”13 and would ultimately have to give way 
before the fullness of the sea. In it, Bergson indicates: first and foremost, that 
the metaphysics that is already underway, and which he intends to develop, 
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no longer has anything in common with the metaphysics practiced before 
Kant; that he is even the first to lift it up [relever] after the blow Kant had dealt 
it; and that he proposes to modify its status sufficiently for it to be able to 
withstand all critiques, for it alone to succeed in moving beyond them, 
unexpectedly using the Critique toward this end. Thus, if Bergson is to be 
believed, an intuitive metaphysics, which installs itself in pure duration, is 
neither below nor beyond Kantian critique, but can pass through it, can 
traverse it in its entirety, since it proposes to surpass it, to prolong it following 
the path that Kant himself had cleared in order to fulfill its suppressed 
virtualities. Indeed, on many points Bergson follows the outlines of the first 
Critique, the Critique of Pure Reason, the only one he took into consideration. 
We are not yet in the period when commentators will look to the third Critique 
for the means of reconciling the first two. Charles Péguy recalled that at that 
time “the Kantians were divided naturally in two: those who reflected on the 
Critique of Pure Reason, […] and those who lived on the Critique of Practical 
Reason,” and that “an abyss separated them.”14 Excepting the isolated 
objections directed at Kantian morality in the first chapter of the Two Sources, 
Bergson belongs, rather, to those who meditated deeply on the first Critique, 
and it will be seen that he respects its major divisions, that his work follows 
in its footprints in order to reform it from within, and to penetrate it 
sufficiently to make room in it for a path that would be able to introduce us 
anew to metaphysics. Bergson’s Kantianism will certainly end up betraying 
the spirit of Kant, but what he means to sublate (aufheben) [relever]—in the 
double meaning of to overcome and to complete—through its revitalization 
in intuition, is no more and no less than Kantian metaphysics, the conditions 
of the possibility of which Kant had teased out before asserting its 
impossibility. We should not then be surprised that Bergsonian metaphysics 
will become an intuitive recovery [reprise] of the metaphysics that Kant—who 
lacked an experience capable of supporting it—had abandoned to the empty 
illusions of pure reason. By refusing, in his turn, the ancient metaphysics that 
he praises Kant for having leveled, Bergson means to revive, on a Kantian 
basis, “the metaphysics of the moderns,”15 such as it had already found its 
source in Descartes, and thereby to advance a metaphysics at least as modern 
as the critique that Kant had made of it—a critique, which some had thought 
could be substituted for metaphysics, once and for all. 
 
Integral Experience 
The opening pages of the “Introduction to Metaphysics” are celebrated, and 
yet what misunderstandings they have provoked! These misunderstandings 
arise from a definition of metaphysics, ascribed to Bergson, which he himself 
attributed to everyone and was unable to take up as his own without first 
submitting it to revision: “philosophers agree”16 to distinguish two 
profoundly different ways of knowing—through analysis and through 
intuition. The one revolves around the thing and grasps a multiplicity of 
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viewpoint on it; the other enters into the thing and knows it absolutely. We 
understand that if Bergson is hesitant to use the word intuition, which “leads 
to a certain confusion,”17 this is because every metaphysics claims this term, 
and in adopting it for himself, he threw the ancient metaphysics that he 
rejected and the new metaphysics that he advanced into confusion. But it 
must have been for this very reason that he was compelled to use it, for he felt 
capable of fulfilling the ambitions that metaphysics had vainly boasted before 
him. In these pages he also had to present metaphysics in a state of 
indistinction, so that he would be able to subsume the metaphysics against 
which he fought and even to agree with those who objected, after Kant, that 
metaphysics alone was possible. In short, adopting the term intuition 
amounted to agreeing to enter into discussion with the metaphysics of the 
past and to revive [relever] its concerns against those who critiqued it. And of 
all of them, Kant was certainly the one who most clearly linked the success of 
metaphysics to the reality of an intuition: “One of the most profound and 
important ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason is this: if metaphysics is possible, 
it is through a vision and not through a dialectic. […] He definitively 
established that, if metaphysics is possible, it can be so only through an effort 
of intuition.”18 From its incipit, the “Introduction to Metaphysics” takes over 
the definition that Kant—far from rejecting it in the framework of his 
transcendental dialectic—had himself formulated, before marking it as 
invalid for a reasonable and finite being. And further proof, were it even 
needed, resides in the first edition of 1903, where Bergson still designates 
intuition as “intellectual,” retaining with this appended epithet the clear sign 
of its Kantian provenance. The article is therefore shot through with a 
profound equivocity, for it retains the sense of intuition sanctioned by Kant, 
before which the ancients fell and beyond which Bergson alone is resolved, 
after some reworking, to go. 
For there are really two ways of understanding intuition, as there are of 
understanding integral experience. And it is necessary to begin with the 
ancient way. Following the latter, intuition would be able to attain the essence 
of the thing outside of its sensible unfolding; experience “would be given to 
me all at once in its entirety [intégralité],”19 whereas analysis, cut off from the 
essence, would only be able to gather fragments that are unrolled and 
scattered in space and time. Considered from this perspective, metaphysics 
claims to possess absolutely in eternity what science, which already moves in 
the relative, only studies as it is unfolded in exteriority. In such an 
arrangement, intuition clearly plays against analysis; and it can only lose. In 
this respect, Bertrand Russell and Moritz Schlick had an easy time promoting 
the discredited analysis against Bergson; they mistook their adversary and 
adopted a conception of analysis that was only the counterpart of intuition 
taken in its ancient meaning. Analytic philosophy contented itself with 
reversing the priorities and opposed to integral experience an experience that 
would be limited to the ensemble of fixed, distinct, and clearly identifiable 
objects. 
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Kant was also right to discredit an intuition of that sort, which results 
from a divine archetype. For the metaphysics that aspired to it raised itself too 
high; it began with the “immediate search for the eternal” and returned with 
an empty and formal concept, which it said served in its place. It was also only 
dishonestly intuitive, being in fact intellectual: “[a]n intuition, which claims 
to project itself with one bound into the eternal, limits itself to the 
intellectual.”20 In other words, metaphysics has at times been able to call 
intuition suprasensible, but for want of ever really arriving at the 
suprasensible, it sought “to get this intuition from its very negation, 
analysis.”21 Is it a question of the soul? It is probably because the true intuition 
of the self, frail and fleeting as it is, in no way resembles what we hoped for 
that we have always preferred concepts that seem more solid—which is to 
say, at bottom, closer to intuition such as we imagined it to be. The perspective 
on the thing became the thing itself, and by a strange twist of fate, the Platonic 
idea became the paragon of the intuitive. Such is the eternal idea of Socrates 
that Plotinus makes accessible to nous and that his soul, whisked away by 
becoming, never stops converting into sensible reflections. As a result, “it is 
because of a confusion between the roles of analysis and intuition that the 
dissensions between schools of thought and the conflicts between systems 
will arise.”22 One must therefore applaud Kant, who, in refusing this 
conception of intuition, reduced metaphysics to what it truly was, namely, a 
simple combination of concepts, a “game of ideas,”23 which would have 
forever divided philosophers. 
But Kant, in his turn, still granted too much to ancient metaphysics; he 
constructed his system of phenomena around an absent, secretly presupposed 
intuition and had to violate the negative conception of the noumenon he had 
wanted to create. Indeed, even though the “thing in itself” is not the ancients’ 
essence, it occupies the place of the Absent and shares with it at least the 
requirement of being a real unity—that which sufficiently demonstrates the 
fact that analysis necessarily revolves around the thing. By refusing to enter 
into the thing, Kant was able to declare it unknowable; however, he still 
assumed it to be one, since the data of sensibility immediately splintered into 
a phenomenal diversity, which, insofar as it was not unified in and through 
the thing itself, had to receive the synthesis it lacked from the transcendental 
subject. A course taught on the Critique of Pure Reason at the Lycée Henri-IV 
in 1893-1894 fully confirms this: “Kant does not create a merely negative idea 
of the thing in itself. He represents it as a unity, but as a unity that is different 
than that of our thought—a unity that is not simply formal, a unity that 
consists in the presence and preexistence of the whole in relation to its parts, 
a unity comparable to that of life, and whose nature furnishes us with an 
image in what is called finality. Without this hypothesis, it seems, there is no 
speculative reason to believe in a thing in itself and not to establish the data 
of sensible intuition as absolute.”24 In other words, if the impossible were to 
occur and I were to reach my soul such as it is “in itself,” I would at once grasp 
the living unity of my personality, from which stems the multiplicity of its 
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phenomenal manifestations. Such a free and a-temporal act cannot, however, 
be grasped intuitively and, in Kant, will have to form the object of a postulate 
of pure reason. Kant thereby retains the ancient framework that he 
denounces, remaining close to Plotinus on certain points, as Bergson often 
suggests.25 
This confirms, as we have shown elsewhere, that the “Introduction to 
Metaphysics” is a tacit critique of the idea of synthesis—and not of analysis, 
which Bergson seeks, rather, to free and to revitalize in intuition. As long as it 
revolves around the thing, intelligence exercises a work of division; but let it 
be severed from the intuition that gives it its interior ballast and it changes in 
nature. Analysis turns into mere decomposition, which transforms the 
analyzed elements into fragments to be recomposed, and requires the 
annexation of an artificial unity from without that it can only superimpose 
upon them. This is what happened to Kant when he prohibited access to the 
thing itself. Having always already lost the original unity, sensibility had to 
start with a multiplicity of given sensations, “which derive, we know not how, 
from the things in themselves, and which insert themselves into time and 
space, pure forms of sensibility.”26 And the entire work of the understanding 
could only be a subsequent work of synthesis, which would consist in making 
the primitive unity of apperception descend into the “sensible diversity” so 
as to embrace it—spreading “over it the network of pure concepts, of schemas, 
of principles, which are so many formulas”27 expressing the impersonal unity 
of the “I think.” It could only give chaos a form by pouring it “into pre-existing 
moulds.”28 In short, for Kant, metaphysics would be possible if our 
knowledge went from the one to the multiple—it would go from intuition to 
analysis; but it turns out that it always goes from the multiple to the one—and 
from analysis to synthesis, for “from intuition one can pass on to analysis, but 
not from analysis to intuition.”29 
There must then be another way of understanding intuition—namely, 
that of Bergson—which permits the fulfillment of metaphysics, while 
prohibiting the return to the metaphysics of the ancients. This is because 
Bergson did not so much reproach the ancients for going as far as they did, as 
for having placed their ideal so high that they could only reach it through 
empty concepts—transcendental ideas. Kant’s only mistake, then, was in 
depriving himself of intuition by positing the absolute as a distinct [séparé] 
term, just as his adversaries had done, without realizing that the absolute is, 
on the contrary, “very near us and, in a certain measure, in us,”30 and that, for 
that very reason, intuition does not require us to “transport ourselves outside 
the domain of the senses and of consciousness.”31 Of course, for him to have 
this realization, it would have been necessary for him to have had the humble 
experience of pure duration, into which consciousness is immediately 
plunged and where it is already assured of reaching an absolute. For it is in 
this contact that Bergson was able to reform the meaning of intuition. Kant 
had discovered that in intuition unity is not external to the multiple, but 
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internal to it by virtue of a multiplicity of fusion or interpenetration. Synthesis 
is immanent to it, so to speak, given immediately, before reflection refracts it 
in space and analyzes it into a multiplicity of disjointed instants. It is in thus 
bringing the phenomenon and the thing in itself closer together, and making 
analysis join up with intuition, if only by a thread, that a new meaning 
breathes life into both analysis and intuition, and allows Bergson to rework 
considerably what must be understood by experience, since it is thereby 
enlarged to the point of incorporating [intégrer] the thing itself. Note, on the 
contrary, how analysis, which Bergson makes revolve around the thing, only 
ever moves in space, leaving only duration to be, against Kant, the object of 
an intuition. Integral experience is no longer intuition, no more than it is 
analysis, but that which, in combining their jurisdictions, will only know a 
thing after having observed it from without and experienced it from within. 
Accepting the simplification that Bergson allows himself in his above-
cited course on Kant, we can say that “the Transcendental Analytic, on the 
one hand, and the Transcendental Dialectic, on the other, will demonstrate 
the legitimacy of physics, on the one hand, and the illegitimacy of 
metaphysics, on the other,”32 and that Kant has thereby cut experience in half, 
whether Bergson agrees to say with him that physics is true on the condition 
that it is not real (Matter and Memory), or whether he instead thinks that it is 
only valid when it refuses to be extended to the totality of the real (Creative 
Evolution). Thus, the method of infinitesimal calculus gives a sufficient idea of 
what must be understood by Bergsonian metaphysics,33 since in defining it as 
“integral experience,”34 Bergson proposes to transcend the objective experience 
that Kant had grounded in the Transcendental Analytic, to the point even of 
penetrating the thing in itself, and of including [intégrer] the real itself, which 
the Transcendental Dialectic had firmly locked away. It is therefore no longer a 
question of the mind [l’esprit] attaining intuition without the help of analysis, 
but of dilating the former by means of the latter, operating “differentiations 
and qualitative integrations.”35 The intuition of duration is obstructed by 
analysis; it is less beyond than beneath. Bergson must critique the data that 
intelligence presents him with if he wants to go beyond the human condition 
and “seek experience at its source,” where it is properly metaphysical. In 
reconstituting the form of the curve “with the infinitely small elements which 
we thus perceive of the real curve,” “[t]he final effort of philosophical research 
is a true work of integration.”36 
In thus sketching the two paths between which the Critique is, in his 
eyes, divided, Bergson’s attitude toward Kant, which was always ambivalent, 
becomes clearer. Matter and Memory stigmatizes both “Kantian idealism,”37 
which affirmed the relativity of our knowledge, and “Kantian realism,”38 
which declared the “thing in itself” to be unknowable, forcing Kant to oscillate 
between two movements, pursuing neither to its final consequences. It is not, 
however, until the final chapter of Creative Evolution that Bergson thematizes 
this double tendency inherent in Kant’s philosophy. On the one hand, he 
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writes, “it is only a continuation of the metaphysics of the moderns and a 
transposition of the ancient metaphysics.”39 Here, Bergson returns to the 
critique that he had addressed to him in the “Introduction to Metaphysics”: 
Kantianism is only a Platonism in which the ideas, illegitimate if they are 
things (metaphysics), become legitimate if they descend to earth in order to 
be relations (science). Such that “the whole Critique of Pure Reason rests also 
upon the postulate that our thought is incapable of anything but Platonizing.”40 In 
Kant as in Plato, the real ends up being resolved into intelligible terms. But on 
the other hand, in reducing the hypotheses needed by mechanical science to 
the minimum, Kant does not go as far as Spinoza or Leibniz, and restrains his 
metaphysical expansion by stopping short before the thing in itself. He 
thereby “stops this dogmatism on the incline that was making it slip too far 
toward the Greek metaphysics.”41 And it is at this point that Bergson 
discovers the germ of a second philosophy. For Kant’s recoil allows him to 
grant Galilean physics an indefinite extension while wagering on his 
metaphysical abdication. In concerning himself only with phenomena, Kant 
liberates new, unknown lands that unlock the thing in itself and immediately 
shut it away again, pointing the way while barring our entrance, for want of 
the ability to penetrate it with an “intellectual intuition”: 
Thereby he prepared the way for a new philosophy, which might 
have established itself in the extra-intellectual matter of knowledge 
by a higher effort of intuition. Coinciding with this matter, adopting 
the same rhythm and the same movement, might not consciousness, 
by two efforts of opposite direction, raising itself and lowering itself 
by turns, become able to grasp from within, and no longer perceive 
only from without, the two forms of reality, body and mind?42 
In other words, the metaphysical withdrawal of physics liberated, with the 
thing in itself, a matter rendered inalienable by intelligence, but Kant, having 
raised it too high, prevented himself from accessing it otherwise, resigning 
himself to his incapacity to reach it. He thereby prepared a new way, or rather 
summoned anew “that essential element of the philosophy of Descartes which 
had been abandoned by the Cartesians.”43 But instead of reviving Cartesian 
intuitions, he preferred to expel them outside of the self, into the “thing in 
itself”—rather than accepting their immediate givenness [donation], as 
Descartes before him had agreed to do: the feeling of freedom, the union of 
the soul and the body, etc. He could have gone a step farther than Descartes; 
instead, he took a step back. Freedom was banished, raised “to the sphere of 
noumena,”44 and the union of sensibility and understanding became “a 
hidden art in the depths of the human soul.”45 But even though Kant, lacking 
a true intuitive experience, was only able to re-establish their truth on the 
moral plane, this was, at the very least, something more than the elimination 
of even their possibility, the pure and simple denial that there is time, that 
there is freedom, that there is union—as was the case for the Cartesians, with 
Spinoza and Leibniz in the lead. It was the demarcation of the empty place 
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that metaphysics would once again be able to occupy, the empty place for “a 
revivified Cartesianism.”46 In beginning with the conquest of these new 
territories, Bergson gives himself the intuition that Kant refused. In plunging 
back into pure duration, he makes explicit his project of gradually integrating 
into experience those portions of the real to which Kant had failed to gain 
access. 
 
The Reprise of the Tripartite Structure of the Critique 
What can it mean for Bergson to pursue in this way the path that Kant had 
indicated? As he reflects on his renewed metaphysics, Bergson seems to want 
to rework the tripartite structure of the Critique (Aesthetic / Analytic / Dialectic) 
such that it would be able to accommodate the intuition that Kant had 
condemned. Even though the formulation is as hasty as it is exaggerated, we 
could say that Bergson is a Kant who had previously discovered the intuition 
of duration, and who rewrote the Critique of Pure Reason under the influence 
of his discovery. Far from constructing his philosophy against Kant, in “a 
decided and decisive opposition with respect to Kant,”47 as has often been 
maintained after Madeleine Barthélemy-Madaule, Bergson finds in him, on 
the contrary, a powerful ally for penetrating farther into the metaphysical 
deepening of intuitive reality, into which Descartes had already begun to 
enter. The Cartesian intuitions—weak, marginal, and soon rejected by the 
Cartesians themselves—will find in the Critique of Pure Reason one of the 
instruments for their intensification. Kant had taken a step backward with 
respect to Descartes’ advances. Nevertheless, Bergson’s Kantianism will take 
a step forward and will be—in his own words, which must be taken à la 
lettre—a “revivified Cartesianism.” Bergson is the philosopher who truly 
wanted to introduce “Descartes into Kant,” pouring a Cartesian matter into a 
Kantian form. Proposing to redeploy modern metaphysics by passing 
through the sieve of the Critique, Bergson must revisit the Critique and invest 
it from within; for he is aware of the fact that there he will be able to fan the 
flames of intuition, instead of leaving its embers to dwindle and die.  
 
Transcendental Aesthetic 
It is necessary to begin with the Aesthetic, since it is also there that Bergson 
begins his own reading of the Critique in Time and Free Will. In his eyes, Kant 
had the virtue of making time and space “intuitions, and not concepts,”48 by 
distinguishing sensibility and understanding at precisely the point where 
they had been confused before him. His mistake is having thought that it was 
necessary to demonstrate their transcendental ideality in order to be able to 
grant them an empirical reality. The formal intuition of space can itself be the 
object of a real experience, which is why, in place of the transcendental 
deduction, Bergson will propose, in Creative Evolution, a real genesis of 
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spatiality and intelligence, each engendering the other. There, he will add to 
the Kantian thesis an “intelligence earned by intuition,”49 which allows him 
to ground intellectual knowledge in reality itself, reserving for physics the 
ability to reach half of the absolute. But that should probably not be 
considered a critique of Kant, being rather a readjustment of the doctrine once 
it has been brought up to speed with evolutionism. Bergson can also grant to 
Kant, in Time and Free Will, that space is an “a priori form of sensibility,”50 and 
then go on to say, in Creative Evolution, that “[w]hat the Transcendental 
Aesthetic of Kant appears to have established once and for all is that extension 
is not a material attribute of the same kind as others.”51 For in having 
“admitted that homogeneous space is a ‘form of our sensibility’,”52 Bergson is 
better able to argue with him about time—in relation to which the real is 
rediscovered, heterogeneous and continuous matter. Such is the subtle point 
upon which Bergson’s critique focuses: Kant missed the experience of 
duration due to the unwarranted parallel that he established between time 
and space, confusing “true duration with its symbol.”53 
The point is subtle—a spatialized time—but from the perspective of a 
Kantianism of Bergson, this objection is not what closes the dialogue with 
Kant, but is its opening. If Bergson had wanted to reject Kantian critique in its 
entirety, he would not have focused his attack on a point as limited as that of 
the notion of time in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Besides, was it really a 
critique? Bergson also recognizes that he would not have been able to wrest 
the experience of duration from the space that is ordinarily imposed upon it 
if Kant had not begun by distinguishing between the matter and the form of 
knowledge. And how can one achieve such a distinction, and make it “very 
precise,” without first overdoing it a little, without beginning with the 
assimilation of time to space, making it a form like space? Without this initial 
excess, Bergson writes, “this vital distinction would probably never have been 
made.”54 But once made, time always comes to rein it in; once made, Bergson 
could always nuance this “overly sharp” distinction and reintroduce time into 
the very matter of our knowledge.  
This is because, for Bergson, it is not a matter of making a system 
collapse by removing one of its stones, but, on the contrary, of seeping into 
the system after having hollowed out a breach, and thus of saturating 
Kantianism by making the intuition he discovered flow through it. The 
Kantian system was impervious to the real. With the experience of duration, 
as Péguy writes, Bergson finds “the almost initial, particularly well placed, 
particularly well found node of resistance, and of weakness, like the chink in 
the armor, if not of all Kantianism, at least of all critical Kantianism.”55 And, 
thanks to this chink in its armor, Kantianism, invincible up to that point, is 
going to know the wound of the real, which it can no longer declare to be 
beyond reach as the “thing in itself.” In view of the books to come, Bergson 
neither rejects Kantianism nor seeks to demolish it, but finds in this point of 
the Transcendental Aesthetic the Achilles heel of this other “battleship of the 
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Dreadnought class,”56 the flaw through which the real, in establishing one fact 
and one fact only—undeniable experience—will be able to penetrate the 
system anew and irrigate it with its vitality. 
Bergson’s Kantianism will therefore differ profoundly from that of 
Kant’s immediate successors, especially Schopenhauer, Fichte, and Schelling. 
They all wanted to dominate the Kantian Everest by attacking it directly, at 
its summit—the Transcendental Dialectic. They all granted themselves the 
intellectual intuition that Kant had declared to be beyond the essentially finite, 
essentially sensible human condition. Repeating the error of the ancients with 
even more clarity, they removed themselves from time and space in order to 
“project [themselves] with one bound into the eternal,”57 and fell back upon 
an empty concept—the “Will,” the “Ego,” or even the “Absolute”—in lieu of 
intuition. Bergson, on the contrary, enters into the Critique along winding 
paths, which are longer and harder going, yet are more certain, in the end, of 
reaching the summit. For, in order to win (supra)intellectual intuition, he only 
needs sensible intuition in the beginning, convinced that the latter is found to 
be “in continuity with it through certain intermediaries.”58 The error of the 
Kantians was having followed Kant in the overly sharp separation that he 
made between them, without perceiving that there is no other way to surpass 
human experience than to sink down into it by installing oneself in sensible 
intuition, which already reaches the absolute and promises to intensify in 
metaphysical intuition. And Bergson can only pass from the one to the other 
through the detour of the critique of our habitual instrument of knowledge, 
which he sometimes calls by its Kantian name, “understanding,” and which 
cannot be surpassed unless we know its limits. Inserted between the Aesthetic 
and the Dialectic there must then be the Analytic, which he will have to master 
if he is to be fortified by the concepts intelligence provides us with, and from 
which the frail light of our evanescent intuitions is able to reflect back to us, 
filtered and intensified. 
 
Transcendental Analytic 
Bergson also basically preserves the Transcendental Analytic in its place, 
making a series of adjustments to it, all destined to irrigate the canals of the 
“Critical” system with the intuitive experience of pure duration, which is its 
new source and initial breakthrough. We will examine two major 
adjustments. 
(i) As we have seen, Bergson praised Kant for having been economical 
with respect to Spinoza and Leibniz, since he grounded Galilean physics on a 
minimum of hypotheses, thereby managing not to slide too far down the slope 
of Greek metaphysics. In withdrawing time from the ranks of the required 
hypotheses, Bergson can be more economical still on such a path, for he 
grounds the objective validity of mechanical science exclusively on the 
spatiality inherent in things. Consequently, the table of categories is no longer 
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necessary, including the category of causality, from which even 
Schopenhauer had still not strayed. It is not even necessary to consider a priori 
synthetic judgments. For those are all exercised in a time that science 
essentially seeks to eliminate, even though it sometimes remains ignorant of 
the fact that it tends toward the principle of identity as toward its goal. In 
those cases “where the probability is so high that it is tantamount to certitude, 
in arithmetic, for example,”59 Kant would have been able to concede, at least 
approximately, that mathematical propositions can be assimilated to analytic 
judgments, instead of defining them as a priori synthetic judgments. At 
bottom, the principle of identity is sufficient and the frames of intelligence are 
absorbed back into it. In short, the notion of space upon which mathematics 
itself is grounded, remains a sufficiently solid base upon which Galilean 
physics can stand. And if Bergson makes it successively into an “a priori form 
of the sensibility,” then into a “diagram [schème],”60 finally a “schema 
[schèma]”61 that intelligence has at its disposal, this is because his concern is to 
shift from the Aesthetic toward the Analytic, so as to make the weight of the 
constitution of objectivity weigh on the latter, and to give sensible intuition 
back its immediate access to the things themselves. But in another sense, this 
shift, being only a consequence of the discovery of pure duration, retains what 
is essential in the Kantian achievement, which limits the mechanism of science 
and clearly demarcates a place for metaphysics. The Kantian distinction 
between the thing in itself and the phenomenon is much too sharp for Bergson 
to accept it as such, and it is quickly replaced by the distinction between the 
whole and the part. But not, as we have already said, before bestowing certain 
benefits. Indeed, without it, “the principle of causality and, consequently, 
nature’s mechanism [would] necessarily be valid for every thing in general.”62 
“[S]ince the principles of knowledge are uniquely destined to organize 
experience and converge with mechanism,” without the existence of the thing 
in itself, “mechanism [would] overrun everything.”63 In short, for Kant, 
physics only gains its validity to the extent that it loses the thing in itself (as 
Matter and Memory will put it) or at least abandons half of reality (as Creative 
Evolution will correct). In other words, the truth of the sciences rests upon a 
tacit contract that forbids them to encroach upon the things themselves and 
to apply the principles of knowledge to that which resists them and gives birth 
to the transcendental illusions of pure reason. Everything, then, is reversed; it 
is not Bergson who can be accused of being pre-critical, but his most fierce 
adversary: materialism. What a return to sender! It is really the theses of 
materialism, or those of contemporary monism, that, as he again says in his 
course, “are found to be lagging behind the Kantian critique.” They overflow 
into the transcendental dialectic and claim to cover reality in itself with the 
very conceptual blanket that the Critique of Pure Reason had successfully 
contained in making it available for a different experience. Let us add that the 
distinction Bergson repeatedly makes between mechanism as “method,” 
which must be praised, and mechanism as “doctrine,”64 which must be 
criticized, is also owed to Kant. Kant showed in his dialectic that there is 
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certainly a speculative interest in presuming the determinism of phenomena 
to be extensible to infinity, namely, that it “encourages and furthers 
knowledge,”65 but on the strict condition that this not be posited in a manner 
as dogmatic as the dogmatism to which it is opposed. 
(ii) The second and principal adjustment that Bergson makes at the 
heart of the Transcendental Analytic is that of grounding the unity of 
mechanism on action, and no longer on thought alone, which is to say, on the 
synthetic unity of apperception—“The I think must be able to accompany all 
my representations.”66 Such is the theory of knowledge that Bergson sketches 
starting with Matter and Memory, which allows him return to the instrument 
of our knowledge, highlighting its limitation and no longer its relativity. For, 
with the pragmatic turn he gives to it, Bergson will know how to surpass 
intelligence in the direction of a positive metaphysics, the a priori revealing 
itself to be nothing but habit. But, once again, what is essential in the Kantian 
achievement is retained. In order to be surpassed, the limits must remain 
secured, as Kant, before him, had secured them in the Transcendental Analytic. 
Whether they are principles of knowledge or frames for our action changes 
nothing of the matter: by abandoning experience in order to function in a 
purely speculative manner, they lead, just the same, to the creation of 
“insoluble difficulties,” which stem from “the self-contradiction into which 
the intellect can fall when it speculates upon things as a whole.”67 The 
introduction to the seventh edition of Matter and Memory concludes on a 
Kantian note: “[…] the habits formed in action find their way up to the sphere 
of speculation, where they create fictitious problems, and […] metaphysics 
must begin by dispersing this artificial obscurity.”68 Bergson and Kant both 
denounce the same transgressive gesture: intelligence creates antinomies as 
soon as it leaves the ground of the experience to which it is practically 
destined—matter. 
These two adjustments have the effect of reconciling science and 
metaphysics right where Kant established their separation. For, in making 
their spheres meet, Bergson restores the honor of experience in two respects: 
first by leading metaphysics back to the facts (Analytic), and then, thanks to 
intuition, by giving experience an extension that it did not have in Kant, 
impinging upon the domain of metaphysics (Dialectic). In other words, on the 
one hand, Bergson transports metaphysical problems onto the field of 
observation, so that they will cease to “forever [give] rise to fresh disputes of 
the schools within the closed lists of pure dialectic.”69 And on the other hand, 
because he has already shown in Time and Free Will that an intuitive 
experience overflows the frames that give it its form, metaphysics will no 
longer be declared to be that which gives rise to antinomies, but, on the 
contrary, that which resolves them. Accompanied by this twofold demand, 
the transcendental dialectic, which traced the perimeter of an impossible 
metaphysics, will, in Bergson, be able to develop gradually into a concrete 
metaphysics. Such that by beginning with “the very premises that Kant 
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posited,” Bergson can assert, in one of his still unpublished courses, that he is 
able to draw from them “a completely, absolutely different conclusion,”70 and 
through a fortuitous reversal, revitalize metaphysics at the precise place 
where Kant had left it for dead. 
 
Transcendental Dialectic 
In closing, it is the Transcendental Dialectic that Bergson takes over in its 
entirety, that he even rigorously maintains as the ever-valid critique of 
metaphysics. It is necessary to guard against a hasty reading that would say, 
on the contrary, that this is one of the achievements to which Bergson does 
not return: Kant’s Critique “is, in my opinion, definitive in what it denies.”71 
Armed only with physical principles, reason was bound to take itself for its 
own worst enemy and to transform metaphysics into a field of battle. It is 
therefore an immense achievement to have prohibited it from pronouncing 
itself for or against the existence of the soul, of the world, or of God, by 
invalidating the specious arguments through which it contradicts itself. And 
Bergson can be grateful to him for having cleared away the ancient 
metaphysics, which, as it held sway from Plato to Leibniz and beyond, 
advanced through the combination of concepts, and which was the only 
metaphysics that Kant knew. For this reason, Bergson employs the term 
“dialectic,” even “pure dialectic,” in an intentionally Kantian sense, though 
he brings it surprisingly close to its Platonic meaning.72 Kant thus preserved 
an entire domain, driving intelligence away from it in order to prevent it from 
being further laid to waste. But where he holds himself back from engaging, 
from “installing himself” “through a superior effort of intuition,” 
withdrawing, in his turn, like a wave following its reflux, Bergson decides to 
press on with his reconciling intuition. Because he is armed with duration, he 
can reverse the meaning of the Kantian Critique: as soon as experience allows 
itself in fact to transgress the Kantian prohibition, intelligence ceases to be 
“relative,” revealing itself instead to be “limited”73 to the practical frames in 
which it confined experience. As soon as the limit is crossed and experience 
is discovered beyond its frontiers, it no longer seems as though metaphysics 
transgresses experience; it seems, on the contrary, that it must transgress the 
understanding if wants to define itself as “integral experience.” Ancient 
metaphysics worked with empty concepts in an infinite dialectic that put 
intelligence in contact with itself; the new metaphysics rests upon an intuition 
that allows it to make intelligence overflow in the direction of a properly 
metaphysical experience, larger than the conditions of possibility that direct 
its performance [la mettent en scène] by submitting it to objectivity. This is 
because intelligence does not cover experience perfectly. But whereas Kant, 
on the basis of an imperious way of thinking, asserted the latter to be narrower 
than the former, Bergson discovered it to be the wider of the two. For it is 
enough for intuition to succeed in penetrating the thing itself, as it does in 
Bergson, for it to escape from the concept’s sights, overflowing it in all 
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directions. Allowing ourselves to plagiarize in advance, we could say that, in 
Bergson, the phenomenon is saturated with intuition to the point of exceeding 
every concept and of subverting even the principles of knowledge.74 And 
because Bergsonian metaphysics is, as Bergson himself said, “completely 
saturated with experience,”75 transcending physics amounts to 
“transcend[ing] pure intelligence,”76 to joining up with bare experience, not 
leaving it behind. 
Making Bergson’s Kantianism explicit, as we have just done, gives us 
the opportunity to give Bergsonian metaphysics a precise status and, at the 
same time, to make sense of a passage in the Introduction to The Creative Mind 
that still seemed obscure to us. In it, Bergson states that science embraces part 
of reality and is therefore “already fulfilling half of the program of the old 
metaphysics,”77 and that the other half must be returned to metaphysics, 
properly speaking. The Wolffian distinction between metaphysica generalis and 
metaphysica specialis is certainly taken up again, here, but to the exact extent 
that it maps precisely onto the contours it was given in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. The physical science that is grounded in the transcendental analytic 
reaches the absolute and could rediscover, with Bergson, its ancient name of 
general metaphysics “if it did not prefer to keep the name of science.”78 For 
following Kant’s replacement of “the proud name of an ontology” with “the 
modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding,”79 Bergson 
concludes by granting such an analytic the ability to reach one of the two parts 
of the absolute, and granting science the ability to fulfill one of the two halves 
of the program of ancient metaphysics—namely, metaphysica generalis: 
knowledge of matter. On the other hand, the metaphysics that is invalidated 
by the transcendental dialectic must be capable of relating to the other half of 
the absolute: knowledge of mind [l’esprit]. After Gilles Deleuze and Alain de 
Lattre, anyone who wants to see a Bergsonian ontology will have to explain, 
among other things, this Bergsonian declaration, which, in my opinion, 
definitively buries the very possibility of any such ontology. Deleuze will 
formulate an “ontology of duration,” through which Bergson, in creating his 
own problems, will have sought to free himself from the ancient problems, 
once thought to be eternal: those of the soul, the world, and God. It is 
necessary to recognize, however, that the opposite is in fact the case. Not only 
is there no and can there be no ontology in Bergson (as the theory of 
knowledge requires), but if there is a metaphysics, it is the very same 
metaphysics that Deleuze had refused to find in Bergson, and which bears 
upon the soul, the world, and God: namely, metaphysica specialis. Finally, let 
us add that if he follows the Critique of Pure Reason, Bergson is able to give a 
different designation to the tripartition that governs it, which would overlap, 
in a certain sense, with the tripartition that Frédéric Worms located in 
Bergson’s own work, especially in Matter and Memory:80 psychology, theory of 
knowledge, and metaphysics—with this difference, that by psychology, it will 
be necessary here to understand reality such as it is given to immediate 
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consciousness, and not the discipline that takes the latter as the theme of its 
study.  
Kant will have been less the Christopher Columbus of a new world than 
its Moses, dying before setting foot in it and stopping at its borders, already 
too old to believe it possible to cross them, but raising his finger toward this 
terra incognita, calling on new generations who will have the courage to 
venture forth and to live through still untried experiences. It was enough for 
Bergson to have discovered pure duration in the hollow of an intuition to 
reverse the meaning [sens] of the Kantian Critique: the domain of special 
metaphysics, which the transcendental dialectic had closed off, is freed once 
more, but not without having benefitted from the groundwork carried out by 
the critical effort. Indeed, if Kant made it definitively possible to reject 
dogmatic metaphysics, it is quite likely that the intuitive recommencement 
[relève] that Bergson enacts will not make the new metaphysics fall back upon 
the failings of ancient metaphysics and will not identify itself with any of the 
positions that have already been occupied and that Kant has condemned in 
advance in the framework of his pure dialectic. One must, then, go farther and 
another contribution will be necessary if one wants to show how Bergson’s 
œuvre follows the program of special metaphysics step by step, going back 
over the very ground that Kant had covered, following his footprints, 
following the rhythm of the transcendental ideas of pure reason in the exact 
order he had given them in the Transcendental Dialectic. Should this 
interpretation prove correct, we would also be in a position to perceive, on the 
basis of their respective readings of Kant, the widely diverging interests 
motivating the decision, in Heidegger and in Bergson, to introduce us to 
metaphysics anew: an ontological re-reading of the Transcendental Analytic in 
the Kantbuch81 and an empirical re-reading of the Transcendental Dialectic in 
the works of Bergson. There, Kant had presented a magnificent program and 
Bergson, with intuition as his figurehead, wanted to take hold of its promises, 
declared by Kant to be untenable. Let us content ourselves here with drawing 
up a chart of this program, in the hopes of returning to it later in greater detail: 
 
Time and Free Will 
I. Rational psychology: the paralogisms of pure reason 
i. Paralogism of substance 
ii. Paralogism of simplicity 
iii. Paralogism of personality 
According to Kant, these three concepts give us “spirituality.”82 
 
Matter and Memory 
i. Paralogism of the ideality (of outer relation) 
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Its status differs from the first three paralogisms in that it relates the soul “to 
objects in space” and bears upon “the commerce with the body.” 
 
II. Rational Cosmology: the antinomies of pure reason 
i. First antinomy of pure reason 
ii. Second antinomy of pure reason 
 
Creative Evolution 
iii. Third antinomy of pure reason 
iv. Fourth antinomy of pure reason 
 
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
i. Rational theology: the Ideal of pure reason 
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